Deadly Over-Doses and Private Equity - the Case of Bain Capital's Methadone Clinics

Some reporting by Bloomberg provides more evidence about what happens when direct care of the most vulnerable patients is commercialized.  The vulnerable patients in this case were narcotic addicts.

By way of introduction, one method of treating narcotic addiction is the use of methadone.  Methadone is a narcotic that may block the "high" produced by other narcotics and thus may lead to the abuse of these drugs.  Because methadone is long-acting and can be given orally in liquid form, methadone clinics traditionally provided patients one dose a day which they swallowed on the spot.  The methadone would presumably block their craving for other narcotics for that day, and the method of administration would prevent diversion of the drug.  Methadone clinics became more prevalent starting in the 1960s, and like most "health care provider organizations," as we now call them, were then largely non-profit.

On a personal note, in the 1980s, I was the internal medicine physician for a non-profit hospital based methadone clinic designed for patients who had become addicted to prescription narcotics.  It was a challenging task, but the challenges seemed manageable.  That was then.

Nowadays, methadone clinics are more likely to be for-profit.  In this brave new world of for-profit "health care delivery," there may be problems unlike those seen "back in the day."   For example, Bloomberg just reported on a case with a distinctly colorful title

Dead Man Spurs Methadone Probe at Bain’s CRC Clinic in Baltimore 

Maryland state regulators are investigating an addiction-treatment clinic owned by Bain Capital Partners LLC after the methadone-related death of a Baltimore man. 

The probe is focused on the Pine Heights Treatment Center in Baltimore, one of dozens of clinics operated by Bain’s CRC Health Corp., the largest methadone-treatment provider in the U.S. It was triggered by a complaint from the public, said Dori Henry, a spokeswoman for the state Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. She declined to comment on the investigation’s details.

The complaint alleges that Warren Lumpkin, 34, a forklift operator, died on Jan. 4 after ingesting methadone that was given to him by a CRC patient, according to a copy obtained by Bloomberg News. An autopsy found that 'methadone intoxication' contributed to his death, records show.

Lumpkin’s ex-wife, Sabrina M. Lumpkin, who filed the complaint, said in it that he wasn’t a patient at the CRC clinic. He had a friend who was, and that friend gave half a dose of methadone from the clinic to Lumpkin, according to the complaint. 

Note that "back in the day," such an event would have been nearly impossible.  As noted above, patients were given a cup of liquid containing their daily methadone dose, and drank it under observation.   Practically, they could not "cheek" or otherwise divert the drug.  Of course, that approach required personnel to observe each patient each day.  Paying those personnel made the operation more expensive.  "Back in the day," though, non-profit hospitals and clinics were willing to provide the service in the interest of making sure the patients, and only the patients got the prescribed treatment.

Things may be different when methadone clinics are run for a profit.  A Bloomberg investigative report published in February looked into the operations of the company that owned the clinic in Maryland.  That too had a provocative title and started with a similarly disconcerting case.

Drug Users Turn Death Dealers as Methadone From Bain Hits Street 

 After Jennifer Vanlieu turned to methadone treatment to beat an addiction to heroin and pain pills, she morphed from drug user to convicted drug dealer.
 
Vanlieu said she got a carryout methadone dose at a clinic operated by CRC Health Corp. in Richmond, Indiana, in March, 2010, and then gave about 15 milligrams to her friend Carissa Plemons. Plemons died hours later, after ingesting a lethal mix of methadone and other drugs, according to police reports.

Take-home methadone -- doses patients carry out instead of taking at clinics -- enabled the abuse, said Vanlieu, 26, who was sentenced to six years in prison for dealing the drug to Plemons. While she didn’t sell it to her friend, she said in an interview that other clinic patients often resold their take- homes. CRC is owned by Boston-based Bain Capital Partners LLC and is the largest U.S. provider of methadone treatment.

'Some would sell it in the parking lot,' she said. 

As in the first case, unlike the process "back in the day," now patients, who are almost all presumably narcotic addicts, may be given multiple doses of liquid methadone to take home.  They are no longer required to take a daily dose of methadone under observation.  As the case above illustrates, it is all too easy to divert take home doses of methadone.  While methadone can be used to block the effects of other narcotics, it can also be abused.  Obviously, as in the cases above, abused methadone can cause a lethal overdose. 

Wide Use of Take-Home Methadone

The Bloomberg report found multiple instances in which CRC Health clinics handed out multiple take-home methadone doses apparently without proper consideration of the risk or supervision of the patients.

 In states where CRC has had its highest patient counts -- Indiana, West Virginia, California and Oregon -- available data and interviews show the company tries to provide take-home packages, which range from one dose to as many as 30, more often than other clinics.

In addition, 

The Richmond, Indiana, clinic gave take-home methadone to a patient who flunked a drug test, a January 2012 audit found. The company’s Williamson, West Virginia, clinic didn’t immediately revoke take-homes from a patient who had two positive drug tests in 2010, records show. In 2011, inspectors found no evidence that a physician at CRC’s clinic in Renton, Washington, used 'good clinical, judgment' in giving patients carryout doses.

A CRC center in Chattanooga, Tennessee, failed to supervise take-home doses properly in a case 'clearly indicative of drug diversion,' state authorities found in June 2011. The company’s clinics in Claymont, Delaware, and Coatesville, Pennsylvania, were faulted in May 2012 and October 2010, respectively, for giving carry-outs to patients who missed required counseling, records show.

As for the spot-checks Herschman described -- they hardly ever happened at CRC’s clinic in Goldsboro, North Carolina, said Liaudaitis, the former counselor. 

Furthermore,

In Indiana, CRC’s five clinics served 69 percent of methadone patients in 2011, while distributing 96 percent of the take-homes tracked by state records. Patients of CRC’s dozen California clinics received carryout packages of as many as 30 doses at a rate twice that of all others. In Virginia, 74 percent of patients at CRC’s three clinics got at least one take-home dose a week in August 2012, while 47 percent of patients at all other clinics did, state records show. 

The Business Model Behind Take-Home Methadone

So why would a methadone clinic hand multiple doses of an abusable narcotic to narcotic abusers?  The Bloomberg article went on to document some possible reasons which ultimately have to do with the business model of for-profit methadone clinics.

First of all, providing multiple doses of methadone requires less time from clinic personnel, which is handy when the clinics may be under-staffed by over-worked poorly paid personnel.  

'That was the culture -- keep the census up,' said Mike Liaudaitis, who worked as a counselor at CRC’s clinic in Goldsboro, North Carolina, from mid-2009 until early 2011. He recalls being swamped with a 64-person caseload that exceeded the state’s limit of 50. 

Also,

'Clearly the company is saving money if they’re distributing multiple take-home doses at one time,' said West Virginia Delegate Don Perdue, a Democrat who has pursued stricter oversight of for-profit clinics. 'They don’t have to have as many staff handing out the merchandise.'

In particular,

the Goldsboro clinic -- like others described by regulators and former CRC employees in Indiana and West Virginia -- was frequently understaffed, Liaudaitis said.

Since Jan. 1, 2009, CRC’s clinics haven’t met staffing standards more than 50 times, regulatory records from 15 states show. Clinics were cited 80 times for failing to document that they gave patients enough counseling. In response, the company agreed to hire more, recruit more aggressively and increase supervision. Competition for qualified workers is intense, CRC said in its 2011 annual report.

CRC didn’t pay well enough to attract or keep experienced counselors, said Malaysia Williams, who worked at its clinic in Huntington, West Virginia, from June 2009 through March 2010. 'Nobody stayed there,' she said. 'It paid poorly.'

Williams got $13 an hour, she said -- about the same amount other former counselors reported. That’s roughly $27,000 a year. 

There is evidence that under-staffing, under-payment of personnel, and the wide use of take-home methadone lead to big increases in short-term revenue for CRC Health, the for-profit corporation running the clinics.

 Until recently, there was little difference between the operations of for-profit and non-profit methadone clinics, said Thomas D’Aunno, a professor of health policy and management at Columbia University who has tracked the treatment centers for years. That changed in 2011 survey data, which showed 'significant differences,' he said: For-profit clinics had fewer staffers than public clinics.

As Williams struggled to catch up in Huntington, the clinic pushed its revenue up almost 8 percent to $5 million in 2010 -- while expenses increased less than 1 percent to $2.6 million, according to state regulatory documents. 

Private Equity's Take Over of Methadone Clinics

The potential for big revenues has drawn private equity into the world of methadone maintenance for the treatment of narcotic addiction.

 Nurtured by government spending, methadone clinics spread nationwide in the 1960s and ’70s until strapped state and local governments began decreasing their outlays. By 2010, for-profit providers controlled 52.8 percent of the 1,200 U.S. clinics.

Over the past seven years, private equity firms have invested more than $2.2 billion in substance-abuse treatment and behavioral health companies in 62 deals, according to PitchBook Data Inc., a Seattle-based research firm.

Addiction-treatment companies are 'some of the most sought-after -- and valuable -- acquisition candidates in health care,' partly because of profit margins that can top 20 percent, according to the Braff Group, a Pittsburgh-based mergers and acquisitions advisory firm.

 As it turns out, CRC Health was acquired by one of the more notable private equity firms.

Bain Capital, the private equity firm co-founded by former Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, paid $723 million for CRC in 2006, corporate filings show. Romney, who left Bain in 1999, had no input in its investments or management of companies after that, he has said.

Still, Romney reported last year that he owned more than $1 million worth of a Bain fund that holds most of CRC’s shares. He reported receiving between $100,000 and $1 million in dividends, interest and capital gains from that holding, as well as income from two other Bain funds with interests in CRC, according to the financial disclosure he filed with the U.S. Office of Government Ethics in June. Bain executives declined to comment, said Alex Stanton, a spokesman. Representatives for Romney didn’t respond to requests for comment.

 CRC has reported paying Bain about $15.4 million in management fees along with $7.2 million in fees related to the merger since 2006. The company’s revenue more than doubled to $446 million in 2011 from $209 million in 2005. Methadone clinics generated more than a quarter of the 2011 revenue, $123 million.

Note that last year, when Mr Romney was running for the US Presidency, and hence his ties to Bain Capital were particularly newsworthy, several investigative reports about care at Bain owned health care provider organizations were published.  We posted about issues at another CRC Health operation, Aspen, which operates in -patient treatment centers for psychiatric patients.  Investigative reporting about that part of CRC Health also suggested that the company was putting short-term revenue ahead of patient welfare.  We also posted about issues at HCA, a for-profit hospital chain partially owned by Bain, which again suggested revenue came before patients. 

In one sense, this should be no surprise, since the business model for private equity is all about extracting the most money in the shortest time for acquired corporations.  (Look here for more details.)

Summary

We now have more evidence that patients "cared for" directly by for-profit corporations, especially those owned by private equity firms, do not do well.  Meanwhile, the top executives of these firms do exceedingly well.

We have noted how health care organizations have increasingly been "financialized," lead by executives who put short-term revenue generation ahead of all other goals, including good patient care. Furthermore, hospitals are increasingly likely to be formally for-profit, and hence likely to be lead by such executives. Worse, hospitals are increasingly likely to be owned by private equity firms, further increasing the emphasis on short-term money making. Even worse, physicians are now more frequently employed by such organizations, which may pressure them to do what it takes to increase revenue, no matter what the effect on patients' and the public's health.

The probably effects on the quality of care, access, and costs are obvious.

In my humble opinion, before the health care bubble bursts, we need to challenge the notion that direct health care should ever be provided, or that medicine ought to be practiced by for-profit corporations. Before market fundamentalism became so prominent, many states prohibited the corporate practice of medicine, and the American Medical Association forbade the commercialization of medicine.

 It is time to heed that wisdom. I submit that we will not be able to have good quality, accessible health care at an affordable price until we restore physicians as independent, ethical health care professionals, and until we restore small, independent, community responsible, non-profit hospitals as the locus for inpatient care.

 True health care reform will require an end to market fundamentalism in health care.

The "King of Pain" Recants - Pharmaceutical Paid Key Opinion Leader Admits It Was All "Misinformation"

This may be a first.  A Wall Street Journal story announced that the "key opinion leader" who played a pivotal role in the promotion of  aggressive use of narcotics to treat non-malignant chronic pain has had a change of heart.  

Background - Embracing Narcotics

In the long ago time when I was in medical school, the wisdom was then that narcotics (that is, drugs like morphine or heroin, the latter not legal) should only be used in severe acute pain, like that due to bad trauma or occurring post-operatively, or for the pain of terminal illnesses, like cancer.  The reason their use was so restricted was that the drugs were believed to cause frequent adverse effects, from severe constipation, to addiction, to respiratory depression and death.

However, starting in the 1990s, the conventional wisdom changed.  Suddenly, the focus was on the under-treatment of chronic, but not malignant pain, and it became permissible, or even preferable, to use potent narcotics for this purpose.  Physicians like me who were very conservative in their use of narcotics were chastised for under-treating pain.

The Wall Street Journal article explained how this radical change in approach was apparently engineered by a few key opinion leaders, particularly Dr Russell Portenoy.  It opened,

Two decades ago, the prominent New York pain-care specialist drove a movement to help people with chronic pain. He campaigned to rehabilitate a group of painkillers derived from the opium poppy that were long shunned by physicians because of their addictiveness.

Dr. Portenoy's message was wildly successful. Today, drugs containing opioids like Vicodin, OxyContin and Percocet are among the most widely prescribed pharmaceuticals in America. 

The article provided graphics showing that per capita prescription narcotic use has more than tripled since 1999, 

A Change Driven by Wishful Thinking, not Evidence

Unfortunately, as the article made clear, the radical change that seemed so odd to some of us physicians who were trained before the 1990s was not driven by any good evidence from clinical research.

Per the WSJ,

Because doctors feared they were dangerous and addictive, opioids were long reserved mainly for cancer patients. But Dr. Portenoy argued that they could be also safely be taken for months or years by people suffering from chronic pain. Among the assertions he and his followers made in the 1990s: Less than 1% of opioid users became addicted, the drugs were easy to discontinue and overdoses were extremely rare in pain patients. 

However, Dr Portenoy's contention seemed to be based only on a small case-series of patients, lacking any sort of control group, and too small and likely too selective to generalize, particularly to patients with chronic, non-malignant pain.(Portenoy RK, Foley KM.   Chronic use of opioid analgesics in non-malignant pain: report of 38 cases. Pain 1986; 25:171-86.  This article does not seem to be available online.)

In 1986, at the age of 31, he co-wrote a seminal paper arguing that opioids could also be used in the much larger group of people without cancer who suffered chronic pain. The paper was based on just 38 cases and included several caveats. Nevertheless, it opened the door to much broader prescribing of the drugs for more common complaints such as nerve or back pain. 

 Dr Portenoy also cited

the statistic that less than 1% of opioid users became addicted.

Today, even proponents of opioid use say that figure was wrong. 'It's obviously crazy to think that only 1% of the population is at risk for opioid addiction,' said Lynn Webster, president-elect of the American Academy of Pain Medicine, one of the publishers of the 1996 statement. 'It's just not true.'

The figure came from a single-paragraph report in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1980 describing hospitalized patients briefly given opioids.

The reference here appears to be a letter to the New England Journal of Medicine ( Porter J, Jick H. Addiction rate in patients treated with narcotics. New England Journal of Medicine 1980; 302:123.  Link here.)  This was literally one paragraph long, so the methods of the research it reported cannot be rigorously evaluated.  In any event, the letter appears to have retrospectively documented an observation of hospitalized patients who were given at least a single dose of narcotics, and thus appears not relevant to the effects of long-term narcotics on patients with chronic pain. 

Thus, Dr Portenoy's enthusiasm for aggressive use of narcotics in non-malignant chronic pain was never based on any good evidence from well designed and performed randomized controlled trials with long-term followup that showed that narcotics were safe and effective in this setting.  At best, Dr Portenoy's and colleagues' contentions that narcotics should be liberally utilized for such patient were based on wishful thinking, not good evidence.


A Change Driven by Stealth Marketing

The WSJ article documented how Dr Portenoy was a prime mover in what appeared to be deceptive stealth campaigns to market narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain.  Dr Portenoy's 1986 case-series

opened the door to much broader prescribing of the drugs for more common complaints such as nerve or back pain.

Charming and articulate, he became a sought-after public speaker. He argued that opioids are a 'gift from nature' that were being forsaken because of 'opiophobia' among doctors. 'We had to destigmatize these drugs,' said Dr. Portenoy.

He rose to chairman of pain medicine and palliative care at Beth Israel Medical Center in New York. His small office is studded with awards and evidence of his offbeat sense of humor. He prominently displays a magazine mock-up that jokingly dubs him 'The King of Pain.'

At medical conferences, his confident, knowing manner helped smooth the way for his message. Before an audience of government regulators, he once joked that he might tell a patient at low risk of abuse: 'Here, [have] six months of drugs. See you later,' he said, according to a Food and Drug Administration transcript. Amid laughter, he added, 'It's just hyperbole. I don't actually do that.'

Steven Passik, a psychologist who once worked closely with Dr. Portenoy and describes him as his mentor, says their message wasn't based on scientific evidence so much as a zeal to improve patients' lives. 'It had all the makings of a religious movement at the time,' he says. 'It had that kind of a spirit to it.'

So Dr Portenoy became a respected opinion leader.  His influence was demonstrated by how he generated disciples

 Dr. Portenoy's ideas about opioids reached into mainstream medicine and attracted outspoken advocates. In a 1998 talk in Houston, Alan Spanos, a South Carolina pain specialist, said patients with chronic noncancer pain could be trusted to decide themselves how many painkillers to take without risk of overdose. According to a recording, Dr. Spanos said he understood that a patient would simply 'go to sleep' before stopping breathing. While asleep, he said, the patient 'can't take a dangerous dose. It sounds scary, but as far as I know, nobody anywhere is getting burned by doing it this way.'

Dr Portenoy was affiliated with organized efforts that facilitated the marketing of narcotics for chronic malignant pain.  The marketing used clinical practice guidelines to push narcotics

Dr. Portenoy helped write a landmark 1996 consensus statement by two professional pain societies that said there was little risk of addiction or overdose among pain patients. 

The campaign enlisted government regulators, and thus seemed to include an element of regulatory capture,

One of Dr. Portenoy's chief complaints was that doctors were reluctant to prescribe opioids because they feared scrutiny by regulators or law enforcement. In the second half of the 1990s, he and his followers campaigned successfully for policies to change that.

In 1998, the Federation of State Medical Boards released a recommended policy reassuring doctors that they wouldn't face regulatory action for prescribing even large amounts of narcotics, as long as it was in the course of medical treatment. In 2004 the group called on state medical boards to make undertreatment of pain punishable for the first time.

This case demonstrated the direct involvement of pharmaceutical companies who sold narcotics,

That policy was drawn up with the help of several people with links to opioid makers, including David Haddox, a senior Purdue Pharma executive then and now. The federation said it received nearly $2 million from opioid makers since 1997. The federation says it derives the majority of its funding from administering medical licensing exams, credential verification, and data services.

A federation-published book outlining the opioid policy was funded by opioid makers including Purdue Pharma, Endo Health Soluttions Inc, and others, with proceeds totaling $280,000 going to the federation. .

 The campaign also involved an important hospital accrediting organization

In 2001, the Joint Commission, [JCAHO] which accredits U.S. hospitals, issued new standards telling hospitals to regularly ask patients about pain and to make treating it a priority. The now-familiar pain scale was introduced in many hospitals, with patients being asked to rate their pain from one to 10 and circle a smiling or frowning face.

The Joint Commission published a guide sponsored by Purdue Pharma. 'Some clinicians have inaccurate and exaggerated concerns" about addiction, tolerance and risk of death, the guide said. "This attitude prevails despite the fact there is no evidence that addiction is a significant issue when persons are given opioids for pain control.'

A Change Leading to Personal Enrichment

Meanwhile, Dr Portenoy was personally profiting from his relationships with pharmaceutical companies

Over his career, Dr. Portenoy has disclosed relationships with more than a dozen companies, most of which produce opioid painkillers. 'My viewpoint is that I can have those relationships, they would benefit my educational mission, they benefit in my research mission, and to some extent, they can benefit my own pocketbook, without producing in me any tendency to engage in undue influence or misinformation,' he said.

Dr. Portenoy and Beth Israel declined to provide details of their funding by drug companies. A 2007 fundraising prospectus from Dr. Portenoy's program shows that his program received millions of dollars over the preceding decade in funding from opioid makers including Endo, Abbott Laboratories, Cephalon, Purdue Pharma and  Johnson & Johnson.  

He currently also appears to be on the advisory boards of  Zars Pharma Inc,  Relevare Therapeutics, and Cytogel Pharma.

Thus, it seems that Dr Portenoy fit the usual definition of key opinion leader.  He was regarded as an authority in his area and his opinions were obviously influential.  He was paid by health care corporations with interests in selling their goods or services, in this case, narcotic drugs, and was using his influence to promote individual patient care decisions and policy decisions that facilitated the widespread use of these drugs. 

A Change Leading to Sick and Dead Patients

Since the campaign to "destigmatize" narcotics began, the US has seen what many have called an epidemic of narcotic adverse effects.  The WSJ article provided graphs showing that narcotic related deaths and hospital admissions both increased more than five times since 1999.   As the WSJ put it,

 some specialists now question whether the drugs should be prescribed so freely for months or years to people with chronic pain that isn't related to cancer, as Dr. Portenoy proposed 25 years ago. "People lost sight of the fact that these are dangerous drugs that are highly addictive," said Jane Ballantyne, a pain specialist at the University of Washington. She once agreed with Dr. Portenoy and proponents of broad opioid use but now believes they need to be used more selectively.

Dr Portenoy Recants

What is most remarkable about this case is that it seems to be the first in which a highly influential industry paid key opinion leader has publicly had a change of heart.

Now, Dr. Portenoy and other pain doctors who promoted the drugs say they erred by overstating the drugs' benefits and glossing over risks. 'Did I teach about pain management, specifically about opioid therapy, in a way that reflects misinformation? Well, against the standards of 2012, I guess I did,' Dr. Portenoy said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. 'We didn't know then what we know now.'

I would note there is some sophistry there.  There was never good evidence for narcotics' effectiveness or safety for patient with chronic, non-malignant pain.

In fact, Dr Portenoy also admitted that, sort of,

'Data about the effectiveness of opioids does not exist,' Dr. Portenoy said in his recent Journal interview. To get a painkiller approved, companies must prove that it is better at reducing pain than a sugar pill during short trials often lasting less than 12 weeks. 'Do they work for five years, 10 years, 20 years?' Dr. Portenoy said in the Journal interview. 'We're at the level of anecdote.'

Again, it is not that the data that supported the use of the drugs has disappeared, or that new data has been developed that contradicts the old data.  There never has been any good data, that is, from well designed and performed randomized controlled trials that demonstrate that the benefits of narcotics outweigh their harms for patients with chronic, non malignant pain.  It does not exist now and it never existed.

Dr Portenoy also admitted,

'I gave innumerable lectures in the late 1980s and '90s about addiction that weren't true,' Dr. Portenoy said in a 2010 videotaped interview with a fellow doctor. The Journal reviewed the conversation, much of which is previously unpublished.

In it, Dr. Portenoy said it was 'quite scary' to think how the growth in opioid prescribing driven by people like him had contributed to soaring rates of addiction and overdose deaths. 'Clearly, if I had an inkling of what I know now then, I wouldn't have spoken in the way that I spoke. It was clearly the wrong thing to do,' Dr. Portenoy said in the recording.

So not only did the Wall Street Journal article describe how the overuse of narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain came from wishful thinking energized by the possibility of corporate and personal profit, it showed how the chief medical cheer leader for these drugs now admits he was wrong.


Summary

In summary, it appears that the huge increase in the use of narcotics to treat chronic, non-malignant pain was never based on clear convincing evidence from well-designed studies.  At best it was based on irrational enthusiasm and wishful thinking by some very vocal and persuasive advocates.  These advocates seemed to become "key opinion leaders," that is, influential people who promoted the use of pharmaceuticals while they were being paid by pharmaceutical companies, and were likely involved in what appears to be systematic stealth marketing campaign by the pharmaceutical companies that make narcotics.  These campaigns included production of clinical practice guidelines promoted as authoritative, and enlistment of accrediting organizations and government regulatory agencies.

One particularly disturbing part of this story was the involvement of numerous people and organizations  entrusted by society to promote good medical care.  It shows how physicians, other health professionals, and the public at large must be very skeptical of vocal advocates of new, aggressive, "innovative" approaches, of clinical practice guidelines even those developed by apparently prestigious professional societies, of accrediting organizations, and of government regulators.  That is discouraging, and could lead to the cynical approach of simply not trusting anyone.

I would note, however, that two ways the headlong rush to over-use of narcotics could have been derailed would have been:
-  employment of extreme skepticism of people paid by narcotics manufacturers advocating increased use of these drugs, no matter how distinguished, scholarly, or influential these people appear to be.  This suggests the need for general skepticism of people with financial relationships with health care corporations pushing the goods or services these corporations provide, or pushing policies that would aid the selling of those goods or services
-  a rigorous evidence-based medicine approach, meaning making clinical and policy decisions based on the best evidence found by systematic search from rigorously evaluated clinical research about the benefits and harms of these decisions, informed by patients' values.  Such an approach would have revealed there was never any good clinical evidence to support long-term use of narcotics for chronic, non-malignant pain, the particular "innovation" being pushed in this case.

So I would argue that the case of the legal narcotics pushers underlines the need for utmost transparency about conflicts of interest affecting people and organizations that advocate for particular approaches to health care, and to the management of individual patients; continuing movement to bar at least the most egregious conflicts, as per the Institute of Medicine report on the topic (look here); and the need for the very skeptical, rigorous application of true evidence-based medicine approaches.  

Finally, I must note that this seems to be the first time that a prominent, highly influential key opinion leader  has recanted.  Maybe he will write an article entitled "Dr Drug Pusher?" - just joking, but at least one former  key opinion leader did write the confessional  "Dr Drug Rep."  Maybe this is the beginning of a movement toward health care based on logic and evidence rather than wishful thinking, irrational enthusiasm, or ideology, or even worse, on deception or personal enrichment.